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LASERING IN ON THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION: CAN
THE FCC REGULATE LASER
COMMUNICATIONS?
JOEL THAYER*

ABSTRACT
The United States is in the midst of a "spectrum crunch." The phrase
describes the phenomenon involving more telecommunication devices' dependence on a finite resource: the electromagnetic spectrum a resource
containing radio signals that most wireless telephony devices use, including
cell phones and tablets. Mostly, these devices operate on two types of wavelengths: radio waves and microwaves. As consumers grow more reliant on
these devices in their daily life, the need to explore other waves of spectrum
becomes much more apparent. Market players in the telecommunications
field have started looking into this "spectrum crunch" issue and are reacting
accordingly. Laser communication technology, a technology using infrared
and light spectrum, could be the next feasible solution in resolving this market
concern. However, this potentialmarket transitionleaves some question as to
which agency is best suited to regulate it.
Under the Communications Act of 1934 ("Communications Act" or the
"Act"), the FederalCommunications Commission ("FCC" or the "Commission") traditionally regulates the telecommunications market and, by extension, some devices using the electromagnetic spectrum. However, does the
FCC's congressionaldelegationpursuant to the CommunicationsAct give the
Commission the authority to regulate entities using laser technology, or is the

* Joel Thayer: American University Washington College of Law, J.D. (2015); California
State University, Fullerton, B.A. (2011). Thank you to my family for their ongoing support,
Professor Pamela Meredith for the inspiration for and guidance on this article, and to the
Intellectual Property Brief and its staff for their superior work in the publishing process.
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scope of its authoritylimited to those entities using radio or microwaves?
This Article contends that the FCC may have such authority to regulate
said entities because the Communications Act is not necessarily limited to
those devices using only wires or radio waves. This understandingstands on
three pillars: (1) the explicit mention of the FCC regulating facilities-based
entities using the electromagnetic spectrum; (2) there is no clear definition in
the statute or rules that the term "electromagnetic spectrum" is limited to only radio and microwaves in the Communications Act; and, (3) assuming the
courts find that the FCC's dominion over laserfrequencies is limited under
the CommunicationsAct, services provided by laser communication satellites
could fall within the definition of an "advanced telecommunication" under
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Telecommunications Act" or the
"1996 Act") pursuantto its ancillaryjurisdiction.
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INTRODUCTION

In almost every field, new technologies are essential to market growth.
The telecommunications industry is no different; innovative technologies
are the driving force for a sustainable and thriving marketplace. As cellular
phones, tablets, and other wireless devices become ubiquitous to the average consumer, the need for more available spectrums is rising.. Traditionally, mobile communication has used two types of wavelengths-radio
waves and microwaves-and both are nearing capacity in terms of availability. Colloquially, the Commission calls this phenomenon the "spectrum
crunch."1
The Commission has increasingly attempted to ameliorate this issue in a
variety of ways. For example, the FCC is attempting to conduct a Broadcast Incentive Auction to reutilize and redistribute spectrum for other
commercial use. The goal is to attract broadcasters to sell back some of
their radio spectrum in the 600 MHz band to the FCC so that it may auction
it off to wireless carriers. 2 However, there is no escaping the undeniable
truth: the industry must start looking to other wavelengths on the electromagnetic spectrum to meet the public demand for more quality wireless
services. The developments from laser communication providers, specifically those demonstrated by Laser Light Communications, might be the
next realistic option for the industry in addressing this problem, because it
uses virtually untapped wavelengths within light frequencies and independent from traditional radio frequency bands most telecommunications carriers use. Laser communications carriers provide similar services as other
traditional telecommunications services (e.g., cell phones, broadband, etc.).
The implications of carriers using the light spectrum could lead to better
1. See
Spectrum
Crunch,
FED.
COMMC'N
COMM'N,
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/spectrum-crunch (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
2. See In the Matter of Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of
Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, Docket No. 12-268, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
27 FCC Rcd 12357 (2012) (hereinafter Incentive Auction NPRM).
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service for cell phones or faster Internet speeds because of the variety of
spectrum bands will relieve the pressure off of those carriers using radio
waves to transmit signals.
Although the Commission has had long-standing regulatory authority
over radio and microwave frequencies, it is unclear as to whether it will
have similar authority for laser technologies, which does not use either of
those frequencies. Moving toward devices using laser frequencies that operate mostly on light and infrared waves might cause some concern from a
regulatory standpoint. For instance, assuming market participants mass
produce these laser technologies for commercial use, how would they be
regulated under the FCC's current legal framework? Would these technologies require a new classification from the Act that would require congressional action? This paper attempts to address these legal and regulatory
concerns.
This Article holds that if the market included devices using laser satellites, the Commission would be the appropriate agency to regulate these
services as opposed to antitrust-based agencies, such as the Federal Trade
Association or the Antitrust Division in the Department of Justice. This is
because such devices would provide interstate-telephony services to the
public, falling within the Commission's "duties and purposes" under Section 151 of the Communications Act. These laser satellite services would
also meet the definition of a "telecommunication" under Section 3 of the
Act. Moreover, if courts limit the Act's definition of "telecommunications" to only those technologies using radio or wire due to Section 151's
explicit mention of said modes of transmission, then the Commission could
attempt to assume authority over laser communications by defining it as an
"advanced telecommunication" under Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act.3
This Article also focuses on whether the Commission can impose obligations for services provided by these laser-based entities, and if so, to what
extent. It is clear that if a laser satellite signal were to cause interference to
devices using radio waves, the Commission would have authority to intervene. However, can it regulate the actual telephony services provided by
laser communication satellites? The answer is a reserved "yes," but only
insofar as the Commission follows the proper procedures to promulgate
rules to that effect. As a disclaimer, Congressional action in clarifying the
agency's role in the matter is preferred, but, assuming there is none, the
Commission has the regulatory infrastructure to regulate this technology in
a limited capacity.
To make this argument, the Article will be broken up into four parts.
3.

See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2013).
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Part I gives a very brief description of how laser communications currently
function. Part II provides some background on the types of authority delegated to the Commission by Congress in regulating the telecommunications
market. Part III examines what it means for the Commission to have "authority" and whether laser communications fits into any of those categories.
Finally, Part IV concludes that the Commission may have authority under
its ancillary jurisdiction to promote "advanced telecommunications" under
Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act with statutory grounding in
Section 303(y). However, using the proper rulemaking procedures, the
Commission must first add laser frequencies to the meaning of "the electromagnetic spectrum."
I. WHAT Is A LASER COMMUNICATION
Generally, laser communications is a space-based technology using different spectrums of light to transmit signals from a satellite to a terrestrial
receiver.4 Laser technology has many different uses, ranging from providing telecommunications to law enforcement. One publication reports that
lasers operating at near-infrared waves may be more efficient at transmitting signals than radio waves and it might even "outperform" them.6 The
publication credits this to the way light waves are packed.
This section intends to illuminate some advances in laser communication
technology. It will use examples from both the public and private sectors
to establish how fast this technology is developing. Additionally, due to
this rapid development, it expresses the urgency for the Commission to
start considering its regulatory authority over technologies using this mode
of transmission.

4. Adam Hadhazy, How It Works: NASA's Experimental Laser Communications Systems,
POPULAR
MECHANICS,
(Sept.
6,
2011,
6:00
PM),
http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/space/nasa/how-it-works-nasas-experimentallaser-communication-system.

5.

See id.

6.
See id. ("Lasers can transmit data at rates 10 to 100 times faster than radio. By encoding information into laser-based communications, future satellites, rovers and astronauts
could not only send back postcard snapshots from their destinations, but also stream highquality video from across the solar system.").
7. Nicholas Gerbis, How Laser Communication Works, How STUFF WORKS,
http://science.howstuffworks.com/laser-communication.htm (last visited May 13, 2015)
("Light wavelengths are packed much more tightly than sound waves, and they transmit
more information per second, and with a stronger signal. Laser communications, once
achieved, would be the bullet train to radio's wagon train.").
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A. The Public Sector
In 2011, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA")
announced it planned to test laser communications systems in space.'
NASA called this initiative the Laser Communication Relay Demonstration
("LCRD"). LCRD consisted of three main parts: a commercial satellite
and two ground stations in Hawaii and California. 9 The satellite used invisible, near-infrared lasers to transmit communications signals from it to the
two terrestrial stations.1 0
However, engineers have not yet perfected the technology. For instance,
clouds and inclement weather have been known to have an adverse effect
on the technology's ability to transmit information; NASA is currently attempting to sort through the issue with more tests under LCRD.11 By contrast, radio and microwaves have little difficulty transmitting information
through cloudy or inclement weather. 12 Nevertheless, LCRD contributes to
the rapid progress of this technology in the communication's sphere and
demonstrates the government's interest in promoting its growth.
B. The PrivateSector
Not only the public sector engages in these trailblazing efforts. One
company in particular has been leading the charge in advancing laser communication devices: Laser Light Communications ("Laser Light"). In its
mission statement, Laser Light aspires to be the first Optical Satellite Service ("OSS") provider in telecommunications bringing high-bandwidth data and next-generation cellular services using optical wave technology.13
Laser Light's system is comprised of medium-earth orbit satellites with an
operating system capacity of 6 Tbps, including sat-sat optical crosslinks
and sat-ground optical up/down links at speeds of +200 Gbps, without using any radio frequency spectrum. 14 This means consumers who purchase
these services from a laser communications carrier will have comparable
broadband speeds to other consumers using fiber-optic cables. Thus, this
technology provides more variety in carriers to increase consumer to
choice.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See Hadhazy, supra note 4.
See id.
See id.
See
Laser
Communications

Relay

Demonstration,

NASA,

http://www.nasa.gov/mission-pages/tdnlcrd/lcrd-overview.html#.VEa_9NR4rvN (last visited May 13, 2015).
12.
See Hadhazy, supra note 4.
13. See Home, LASER LIGHT COMM'N, http://www.laserlightcomms.com (last visited
May 13, 2015).
14.
See id.
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With these innovations currently in the development stage from the private sector, it becomes imperative that the Commission start strongly considering its regulatory dominion over this technology. This begs the question, under the current rules, would Laser Light need to get a license from
the Commission if it wanted to provide telecommunications services? This
Note contends that, in the status quo, Laser Light is not obligated to get
such a license. Until the Commission decides to perform the proper rulemaking procedures satisfying the Administration Procedures Act ("APA"),
then it does not regulate laser communications. Therefore, Laser Light
would not need a license from the FCC to provide its service.
Assuming the Commission performs the proper procedures, would it
pass judicial review? The following sections address this question.
II. THE COMMISSION'S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET

Before delving into whether the Commission has authority over laser
communication, it is important to explain where the Commission derives its
authority in the first place. This section focuses on where Congress delegated authority to the Commission under both the Communications Act and
Telecommunications Act. Additionally, this section contains a brief discussion of judicial review if stakeholders were to challenge the Commission's rules.
The Commission is authorized to regulate "interstate and foreign com-15
merce in communication by wire or radio" from Section 151 of the Act.
Under the statute, the agency is tasked with "execut[ing] and enforc[ing]
the provisions of [the Act]. 16 It is important to note that this provision is
only limited to the Communications Act and does not extend to other acts
by which the Commission derives authority (e.g. Telecommunications Act
of 1996) because of the previously quoted language in Section 151.1
Although the statute explicitly references communications by "radio or
wire," courts have not limited the Commission's authority to only those
technologies because of the amendments provided in the 1996 Act."
Moreover, in the "Goals" section of the Senate Report for the 1996 Act, the
act "intended the Commission to establish a national policy framework de15.
16.
17.
18.

See 47 U.S.C. § 151.
Id.
See id.
See In re FCC 11-161, 753 F.3d 1015, 1035 (10th Cir. 2014) (expanding the Com-

mission's authority to broadband services so long as an entity received a subsidy from the
Universal Service Fund (USF)); see generally In re UPH Holdings, Inc., 516 B.R. 873

(W.D. Tex. 2014) (extending the Commission's regulatory history of expanding its authority
to other technologies).
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signed to accelerate rapidly the private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies and services to all Ameri-

cans by opening all telecommunications markets to competition."'1 9 Based
on this language, it does not appear Congress was entirely interested in preserving or favoring a particular technology. The language implies that
Congress's focus was on the telecommunications service rather than the
technology it uses to transmit the signals in advancing their goal.
A. DirectAuthority

The Commission gets its direct authority over the telecommunications
industry from the last sentence of Section 227 of the Act. Section 227
states, "The Commission shall prescribe regulations to implement the requirements of this subsection.
To trigger the Commission's Section 227 authority, the rule must govern
business practices concerning telecommunications. 2 ' A "telecommunication" is "the transmission, between or among points specified by the user,
of information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received .
Additionally, the Act de
fines a "telecommunications senice" as "the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be
effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities
used. ,23 One should notice that there is no mention of a particular technology or direct references to wire or radio in either the definition of telecommunications or telecommunications services. However, Section 151 may
pose a limitation because it explicitly references those mediums; therefore,
the Commissions must overcome this hurdle when promulgating rules under this section.
B. GeneralAuthority

The Commission receives its general authority from two sections of the
Act: Sections 201(b) and 303(r). These statutes give the Commission the
ability to regulate the industry in a more comprehensive manner as opposed
to the aforementioned direct authority under Section 227.
Section 201(b) serves as the necessary and proper clause for the Commission, because it allows the Commission to adopt rules "necessary and

19.
20.
21.
22.

S. REP. No. 104-23, at 1-2 (1995).
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2) (2010).
See id.
Id. § 153(50).

23.

Id. § 153(53).
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,,24

proper in the public interest ....
However, it does not provide direct
authority; it only permits the Commission to impose obligations on companies in order to provide competitive rates to consumers. The Commission
uses this section to prescribe certain rules pertaining to adapting new technologies.
For instance, the writers of both Acts could hardly have anticipated the
rapid consumer adoption of Voice of Internet Protocol ("VolP") services
that later encouraged the Commission to develop rules, such as the VolP
symmetry rule. 26 Section 201(b) permits the Commission to make such
rules so long as it is a logical outgrowth from a statute within the four corners of the Acts. If consumers universally adopt laser communications as a
choice platform, the Commission would most likely use this type of general
authority as a legal justification. However, if it decides to use this provision to promulgate rules for laser technologies, the Commission may run
into an issue under judicial review, because, assuming a court sees this as a
limitation, this section explicitly mentions, "communications by wire or radio subject to this chapter.",27 Yet, this limitation is only applicable to the
Communications Act of 1934 and does not extend to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 because it is abrogated by the phrase "subject to this
chapter." This Article expands on this in more detail when discussing the
Commission's
authority under Section 706 of the Telecommunications
28
Act.
Section 303, collectively, describes the overall powers and duties of the
Commission's authority over radio communications. Among those duties,
the Commission has the "authority to allocate electromagnetic spectrum so

24.

See id. § 201(b) ("The Commission may prescribe such rules and regulations as

may be necessary in the public interest to carryout the provision.").
25.
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 383 (1999) ("[Section] 201(b)
explicitly gives the FCC jurisdiction to make rules governing matters to which the 1996 Act
applies ....
For even though 'Commission jurisdiction' always follows where the Act 'applies,' Commission jurisdiction (so-called 'ancillary' jurisdiction) could exist even where
the Act does not 'apply.' The term 'apply' limits the substantive reach of the statute (and the
concomitant scope of primary FCC jurisdiction), and the phrase 'or to give the Commission
jurisdiction' limits, in addition, the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction." This case holds the Commission may adapt its rules to fit address a particular circumstance so long as it is in the
"public interest.").
26. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.913(b). This rule permits a local exchange carrier (LEC) "relevant inter-carrier exchange charges by it and/or its VoIP partner" for services "functionally
equivalent" to an incumbent local exchange carrier's access service. See also In the Matter
of the Connect America Fund et al., WC Docket No. 10-90 et al., Order, 27 FCC Rcd. 2142,
2143, at para. 3 (2012).

27.
28.

See § 201(b).
See infra Part IV.A.
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as t proidethe
lexbiliy of"use. ,,29 For instance, section 303(r) delegates
as to provide
the flexibility
general authority to the Commission. This statute permits the Commission

to develop rules and regulations and "prescribe restrictions .. .as may be

deemed necessary to carry out the provisions of [Section 303] ."'Additionally, under Section 303(y), the Commission has this authority so long as it
meets the requirements set forth within this subsection.
Although Title III only refers to radio spectrum in its other subsections,
this Article contends that Congress made a conscious choice in writing
"electromagnetic spectrum" in section 303(y) instead of specifying radio to
give the Commission the ability to regulate other spectrum bands. Much
like Section 201, this perceived limitation is only subject to the Communications Act. Even if courts recognize such limitations, they may still validate laser communications regulated under Section 303(y) because the text
does not clarify that the "electromagnetic spectrum" only refers to radio
waves. However, under this approach, the Commission may be limited to
regulating the allocation of the electromagnetic spectrum and not necessarily regulating laser communication services. If this were the case, the following allocation requirements for the electromagnetic spectrum must be
met: (1) the allocation is consistent with international agreements the United States is party to; (2) all rules provide proper public notice and are made
available for public comment; (3) the allocation is in the public interest; (4)
rules do not deter public investment of technological development; and (5)
there would be no harmful interference among users."
B. Ancillary Jurisdiction

The Commission may employ its ancillary jurisdiction where "[it]
has subject matter jurisdiction over the communications at issue and the assertion of jurisdiction is reasonably required to perform an express statutory obligation. ' ,12 Meaning, if the Commission has an expressed statutory
obligations from various titles from either the Act or 1996 Act, then it may

29. See § 303(y).
30. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (2010).
31.
See id.
32. See Southwestern Cable, Inc. v. FCC, 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968) ("It is enough to
emphasize that the authority which we recognize today under [Section] 152(a) is restricted
that reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities .... The Commission may ... issue 'such rules and regulations and prescribe
such restriction and conditions, not inconsistent with law' as 'public convenience, interest,
or necessity requires."'); see also In The Matter of Implementation of Section 255 and
251(A)(2) of the Communications Act of 1935, as enacted by the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, WT Docket No. 96-198, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 FCC Rcd. 6417, 6454, at para. 95 (1999).
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make rules as deemed necessary to accomplish those obligations. Some
scholars argue that the Commission may even use ancillary jurisdiction as a
mechanism to increase competition by adding new technologies.33
However, the D.C. Circuit greatly limited this type of jurisdiction in
Comcast v. FCC.3 4 Here the court held that the Commission's ancillary j urisdiction did not apply to Internet service providers' ("ISPs") network
management practices.35 Although this provides a limitation on the Commission's ancillary authority in terms of what economic behaviors it can
control, the court only took exception to the FCC's attempt to control the
business practices of ISPs. Moreover, it acknowledged the Commission's
"broad and adaptable" jurisdiction over emerging technologies.36 Therefore, the court did not limit the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction because of the
technological mediums used, but rather the level of control the Commission
has on particular business transactions that the Acts do not directly address.
It is therefore possible for the Commission to include laser communications
under this type jurisdiction so long as it has statutory grounding in the
Communications Act, which it may have under Section 303(y).
C. Scope of Authority Under JudicialReview

Generally, the Commission uses an informal rulemaking process when
promulgating rules. Under Section 553 of the APA, the FCC must provide
a proper notice and comment period before it promulgates any rule with the
effect of law.3
If a stakeholder choses to challenge an agency's rule, the stakeholder
must show the rule is "arbitrary or capricious" under Section 706 the Administrative Procedure Act.38 Courts measure whether the Commission has
33. See generally John Blevins, Jurisdiction as Competition Promotion: A Unified
Theory of the FCC'sAncillary Jurisdiction,36 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 585 (2009).
34. See 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
35.
See id. at 661 ("It is true that 'Congress gave the [Commission] broad and adaptable jurisdiction so that it can keep pace with rapidly evolving communications technologies.' It is also true that '[t]he Internet is such a technology,', indeed, 'arguably the most
important innovation in communications in a generation,' Yet notwithstanding the 'difficult
regulatory problem of rapid technological change' posed by the communications industry,
'the allowance of wide latitude in the exercise of delegated powers is not the equivalent of
untrammeled freedom to regulate activities over which the statute fails to confer .... Commission authority .... Because the Commission has failed to tie its assertion of ancillary
authority over Comcast's Internet service to any "statutorily mandated responsibility." (internal citations omitted)).

36.

See id.

37.
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2014).
38.
See id. § 706(2)(A) (holding in overruling an agency's action, the rule or its process must be found "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
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met this standard by using the analytical framework
established in Chevron
39
v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc.
In Chevron, the U.S. Supreme Court set out a two-step process in determining the level of deference the Commission, or any agency, has to promulgate a rule. Courts determine: (1) if Congress was unclear as to its intent
on a particular issue, has it given expressed statutory authority to the agency to address the ambiguity; and (2) was the agency's rule a "reasonable
interpretation" of that statute 40 The test for a "reasonable interpretation" is
whether the promulgated rule is arbitrary or capricious.41 If the answers to
both inquiries are 'yes,' then the court must give full deference to the agency' s interpretation4 2 Courts give agencies highly deferential treatment because of their particular expertise in such matters.
III. THE COMMISSION'S CURRENT AUTHORITY AND DOES IT EXTEND TO
LASER COMMUNICATIONS

For the Article's purposes, the term "authority" means under what circumstances the Commission has any element of control over the economic
behavior of the telecommunications industry. When most 44 discuss whether the FCC has authority to regulate such behaviors, they are generally referring to three titles in the Communications Act: (1) Title II, which creates
authority over telecommunications services; (2) Title III, which allows the
Commission to distribute radio station licenses; and (3) Title VI, which
permits the Commission to impose obligations for multi-channel video
programming distributors ("MVPD") (e.g., Time Warner Cable).
This section of the Article examines the traditional ways in which the
Commission has the authority to impose obligations on certain carriers
based on the types of services each provide. This section is necessary to
advance a discussion as to whether the Commission has regulatory authori-

ance with law... ").
39. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
40. See id. at 844-45.

41.
42.

See id.
See id.

43. See id. at 865-66 ("Perhaps that body consciously desired the Administrator to
strike the balance at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it
simply did not consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge
a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency.").

44. E.g., Lawrence J. Spiwak, What Are the Bounds of the FCC's Authority Over
Broadband Service Providers, 18 No.7 J. INTERNET L. 1, 15 (2015) (discussing the FCC's
direct jurisdiction of broadband providers und Title II, Title III, and Title VI).
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ty over laser communication because obligations imposed by the Comnmission are dependent upon the type of service the company provides. Meaning, if the laser satellite company decides to provide cellular service, it
would be more akin to "common carrier" obligations in Title II of the Act
as opposed to obligations for MVPDs in Title VI.
The point of this section is to evaluate what provisions in the Communications Act would be applicable to laser communications, and to determine
those that must be excluded due to the specific mention of radio or wire.
A. Title II

To trigger Title II obligations, the carrier must be providing telecommunications services. "Telecommunications services" are defined in
the Communication Act as the "offering of telecommunications for a fee
directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardlessof the facilities used., 45 The Act defines "telecommunications" as "the transmission, between or among points
specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change
in the form or content of the information as sent and received. 46 One
should notice that the Act makes no mention that only radio or wire transmissions qualify as a "telecommunications" service and even goes as far as
to say, "regardless of the facilities used."4 However, there is explicit mention of both radio and wire technologies within the defined obligation of
this Title. Therefore, if the Commission designates laser communication
services as a telecommunications service, then, under the Act, the Commission may subject a laser satellite providing such services to "common carrier" obligations with no explicit mention of wire or radio.
Although, there are many provisions that would apply to this definition,
the focus will be on the most relevant provisions. As it relates to this topic,
"relevant provisions" mean those provisions that create barriers for entering
laser satellite carriers providing telecommunications services to consumers.
1. Discriminationand Preferences Obligations

Section 202 of the Communications Act prohibits every common
cartier from "mak[ing] any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, or services" against any
other communications service. Moreover, a Common Carrier cannot give
"any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, class of persons, or locality, or to subject any particular person, class
45.

47 U.S.C. § 153(53) (2010) (emphasis added).

46.
47.

Id. § 153(50).
See id.
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of persons, or locality to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage., 48 These obligations intend to promote access, and reasonable
economic rates for service from the carriers to consumers. In a laser communications context, this would mean that Laser Light's satellite could not
be used to disrupt the signal for one of its telecommunications services because its other services are more profitable. Moreover, Laser Light could
not discriminate against lower-income areas where it is economically feasible for it to provide service. If a satellite carrier were to engage in these
types of practices, it would be subject to a forfeiture penalty under the Section 202 of the Communications Act.49
2. Universal Service Fund Implications

If the Commission designates a laser communications satellite as a
common carrier under the Act, it would be subject to Universal Service obligations due to the 1996 Act expanding Universal Service obligations to
wireless and satellite carriers. 50 Common carriers are subject to Section
254 of the Communications Act, if it provides telecommunications services. Section 254 requires telecommunications carriers providing interstate telecommunications services to contribute to the Universal Service
Fund ("USF").1 USF is a source of funding that the Commission uses to
provide certain telephony services to low-income citizens and high-cost rural areas in the country. Assuming the Commission performs the necessary
rulemaking, laser telecommunications would be subject to USF contribution requirements.52
B. Title III

Title III governs over radio station licenses. This section poses an analytical paradox for the Commission to regulate laser communications. In
that, although Title III serves as the Commission's greatest statutory barrier
for regulating laser communication, it may also serve as its legal justification to do so under Section 303(y). However, that will be further discussed in the Article's Section 706 analysis. This section contends that this
Title, as a whole, will be difficult to pass under judicial review, if challenged, without the authority provided from Section 706 of the Telecom48.

See id. § 202(a).

49. See id. § 202(c) ("Any carrier who knowingly violates the provisions of this section
shall forfeit to the United States the sum of $6,000 for each such offense and $300 for each
and every day of the continuance of such offense.").
50. See id. § 254; cf Connect America Fund, et al., WC Docket 10-90, et al., Report
and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 FCC Rcd. 17663 (2011).
51.
See 47 U.S.C. § 254(d).
52. See generally In re FCC 11-161, 753 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 2014).
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munications Act. 3
However, there is one section of this Title applicable to laser communications, Section 302a, which permits the Commission to make "reasonable
regulations" on devices to prevent "harmful interference" to licensed radio
stations.
This section would allow the Commission to at least impose
standards on the actual laser satellite ensuring that its signals would not interfere with other radio stations. Moreover, it would permit the Commission to establish rules on laser satellites when it causes said interference.
The Commission would not need much justification for regulating such interactions between laser satellites based on this language: "[t]he Commission may ...

make reasonable regulations .

.

. governing the interference

potential of devices which in their operation are capable of emitting radio
frequency energy by radiation, conduction, or other means ....

Mean-

ing, if a device has an electronic pulse and could potentially interfere with
radio transmissions, the FCC can regulate the device, ensuring it will not
harm other devices. A laser satellite probably falls into this category when
disrupting signals, because it exudes electronic signals that have the potential to adversely affect other FCC licensed devices.
C. Title VI
This subsection outlines the basic obligations that the Commission
requires of MVPDs. An MVPD is any cable or satellite company that buys
or produces programming, which then sells bundled programming to individual TV households. 6 If a laser satellite company decided to provide
such services, it would be subject to, at least, these provisions. The definition of an MVPD is technology-neutral, and the added provisions concern-

53.
See infra Part IV.A This Article contends that the Commission may hold authority
under Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 by using Section 303(y) as authority to allocate spectrum for "advanced telecommunications." Moreover, this Article
finds that courts may view the definition of "telecommunications" from the Communications Act of 1934, and by extension Section 303(y), as limited to technologies using wire or
radio. This Article contends that this limitation does not extend to the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, because of the phrase "of this Act" in Section 153 of the Communications Act.
54. 47 U.S.C.A. § 302a(a) (2010) (permitting the Commission to regulate the interfering signals from devices that fall out of its regulatory purview).
55.
See id.
56. See 47 U.S.C. § 522(13) ("the term 'multichannel video programming distributor'
means a person such as, but not limited to, a cable operator, a multichannel multipoint distribution service, a direct broadcast satellite service, or a television receive-only satellite
program distributor, who makes available for purchase, by subscribers or customers, multiple channels of video programming."); see also Bruce M. Owen, Consumer Welfare and TV
Program Regulation, Mercatus Ctr. Geo. Mason Univ. 8 (2012), available at
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Consumer-Welfare-TV-Program-Regulation.pdf.
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ing Digital Satellite Broadcasters ("DBS") make regulation more likely for
laser satellites selling bundled programing. For these reasons, it is important to highlight the relevant provisions of this title.
1. How MPVDs are Regulated

MVPDs run under a "dual revenue" economic
. 57 model. They receive income from subscription fees and advertisers.5 The organization of this
section will consist of a discussion on specific types of MVPDs with their
corresponding regulations, and how the rules affect entrance into the market and market behavior. Due to the nature of the MVPD competitive
landscape,58 there may be some overlap in regulation, meaning there are
some rules and regulations applicable to all MVPDs without much distinction between cable and satellite.
For an MVPD company to enter into the market, the company must adhere to all rules and regulations stipulated by the FCC and Congress. This
section focuses on what MVPDs must do to gain access into the local market.
a. Franchisingand Licensingfor DigitalBroadcastingSatellites
All MVPDs must obtain franchising agreements 59 with state and local
authorities before they can provide video services. 60 This gives state or local governments some control as to which companies can enter their local
market by granting such agreements. 6
Any franchising authority may
award one or more franchising agreements in their respective jurisdictions

57. Adam B. Vanwagner, Seeking a ClearerPicture:Assessing the Appropriate Regulatory Framework for Broadband Video Distribution, 79, FORDHAM L. REv. 2909, 2917
(2011).
58. MVPD economic infrastructures are in two tiers: horizontal concentration and vertical integration. Horizontal concentration is a description of MVPDs' relationship amongst
them describing the reasons as to why some MVPDs compete with one another and others
do not by examining the geographical footprint. Vertical integration focuses on common
ownership of entities that deliver video programing and entities supplying video programming. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Marketfor the Delivery of
Video Programming, Fourteenth Report, Media Bureau Docket No. 07-269, at 38-42 (rel.
Jul. 20, 2012) found here: https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-12-81AI.pdf
[hereinafter Competition Report].
59. The FCC defines "franchise" as "an initial authorization, or renewal thereof (including a renewal of an authorization which has been granted subject to section 546 of this
title), issued by a franchising authority, whether such authorization is designated as a franchise, permit, license, resolution, contract, certificate, agreement, or otherwise, which authorizes the construction or operation of a cable system." 47 U.S.C. § 522(9).
60. See id. §§ 522(10), 541(a).
61.
See id.
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with a caveat that none of the franchises be exclusive to any particular entity. 62 The term "franchising authority" is defined as "[a]ny governmental
authority empowered by federal, state, or local law to grant a franchise. 63
The FCC allows the individual States to distribute political jurisdiction in
any way they see fit. 64 Consequently, some States vest franchising authority in localities of varying levels, while others reserve franchising authority
at the state level, referred to as a Local Franchising Authority ("LFA"). If
the FCC denies an MVPD a second franchise, said MVPD can appeal the
franchising authority's decision pursuant to Section 555.65
The FCC recognized the possible issue with allowing LFAs to possess
too much authority. In response, the FCC adopted Section 621(a)(1) of the
Telecommunications Act in 2007. 66 This added measure prevents LFAs
from being too discriminatory and exclusive to entering companies.

67

This

provision could be of great use for a start-up laser satellite MVPD when
providing bundled services to a saturated market.
To foster a more competitive market, cable and satellite companies are
statutorily subjected to financial burdens, such as requiring a compulsory
signal carriage, or "must-carry" channels. 68 The FCC mandates cable and
satellite companies to reserve up to one-third of their channel capacity to
local terrestrial broadcast television stations.69 Supporters of this licensing
scheme claim that compulsory licenses help cable and satellite companies
balance the cost of providing must-carry channels by obtaining legislative
and regulatory benefits .
Those opposing the must-carry channel requirement claim they overly
favor marginal television broadcasters rather than the actual licensee. 1
Opponents of must-carry channels claim the obligation is unnecessary, and,
in lieu of the must-carry channels, the companies can use the additional
62. See id. § 541(a)(1).
63. Id. § 522(10).
64. See Competition Report, supranote 58Error! Bookmark not defined., at 47.
65.
See 47 U.S.C. § 555.
66. See Competition Report, supranote 58, at 47.
67. See id.
68. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.56 (2012).
69. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992); see also Rob Frieden, Analog and Digital Must-Carry
Obligations of Cable and Satellite Television Operators in the United States, MEDIA L. &
POL'Y 230, 234 (2006).
70. See Frieden, supra note 69, at 234-35.
71. Id. (stating marginal broadcasting stations, such as home shopping networks and
broadcasters operating in a foreign language, are the source of opposition for the compulsory license system).
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video content to provide shows people want to watch, thus maximizing the
amount of profit out of the carriage of such programing. 2 Stakeholders
have challenged the constitutionality of these must-carry provisions twice
in the United States Supreme Court.7' The Supreme Court held the provisions constitutional .
b. Syndicated Network Regulations
i.

Network Non-duplication

Like must-carry requirements, network non-duplication exists as a regulatory protection to keep broadcasters profitable. 75 The FCC requires a
commercial television station, serving at least one thousand subscribers, to
self-govern its licensed video content from illegal distribution under its
network non-duplication provision. 76 For cable companies to have the provision enforced, the television broadcaster must notify the cable community unit77 located in whole or in part within the geographical zone within the
scope of their license. In addition, "a community unit is not required to
delete the duplicating network programming of any television broadcast
station which is significantly
viewed in the cable television community
9
pursuant to § 76.54." ,
ii. Syndicated Exclusivity

Syndicated exclusivity is a form of protection geared towards broadcasters and networks ensuring others are not using their content outside the
scope of the contracted license. Parties who possess syndicated exclusivity
entitlement are those "entitled to exercise exclusive rights pursuant to this
Section [76.122] for a period of one year from the initial broadcast syndication licensing of such programming anywhere in the United States; provid72. See Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52
EMORY L.J. 1579, 1658-59 (2003).
73.
Cristina DeFrancia, Ownership Controls in the New Entertainment Economy: A

Search for Direction, 7 VA. J.L &

TECH.

1, 42 (2002) (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.

FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) and Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997)).
74. See Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC., 520 U.S. 180, 19-01 (1997) (holding that

Congress has a compelling governmental interest in preserving the must-carry provision to
advance the government's goal of promoting a free and equal market).
75.
76.

See DeFrancia, supra note 73, at 37.
47 C.F.R. § 76.122(c).

77. Although the FCC recognizes minor cable communities, for the purposes of this
Article, the reader should assume all discussions are in reference to major cable communities as defined in section 76.51. Id. § 76.51.
78. Id. § 76.92(a).
79. See id. § 76.92(f).
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ed, however, that distributors shall not be entitled to exercise such rights in
areas in which the programming has already been licensed."8 ° Once a distributor obtains a license to video content, it is entitled to use its exclusive
right to said content for a period of one year from the initial broadcasting
syndication licensing, so long as it does not exercise its right in areas outside the scope of its programming's licensed area.81 This obligation may
be problematic for laser satellites, because their technologies might not be
ready to control their signals from going into other markets. As a consequence for not policing their signals, the FCC may be able to impose forfeiture penalties for such violations.
iii. Compulsory License
One of the seminal inquires in the compulsory licensing debate is its relationship to copyright and whether it is enough to constitute an exclusive
right.8 2 In that, a compulsory licensing paradigm limits the amount of deference between the agreeing parties as to their ability to negotiate how the
licensee's content is distributed and accessed.83 For example, the statutorily mandated must-carry stipulations may place the MVPD at a disadvantage when negotiating because those channels take up air space that
could otherwise be used for more profitable programming. Nevertheless,
laser satellite MVPDs would be subject to this licensing scheme under a
compulsory license paradigm.
iv. Retransmissionconsent
Retransmission consent would be the biggest obligations for a laser satellite MVPD, because it can be overly burdensome due to all of the Commission's regulatory requirements. It serves two purposes: (1) protect the
84
broadcaster; and, (2) protect the copyrights transmitted through the signal.
It is considered an alternative to the must-carry provisions provided that all
transactions are conducted in good faith. The Cable Act established the
regulatory scheme for retransmission consent in 1992 with Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 ("1992 Cable

80. See id. § 76.103(a).
81. Id. § 76.103(b).
82. See Midge M. Hyman, The Socialization of Copyright: The Increase Use of Compulsory License, 4 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105, 111 (1985).
83.
See id.
84. See generally Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Retransmission Consent: An Examination of the Retransmission Consent Provision (47 U.S.C. § 325(b)) of the 1992 Cable Act,
49 FED. COMM. L.J. 99 (1996) (outlining the legislative intent and providing a historical context for retransmission consent).
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Act").8 5 Originally, Congress adopted retransmission consent regulation
"to allow broadcasters to negotiate for compensation of the value of their
signals. 8 6 Under the 1992 Cable Act, statutory provisions allow television
broadcasters to elect to proceed under retransmission consent pursuant to
Section 325 of the Cable Act, or follow the must-carry requirements of
Sections 338 and 614 of the Act.8 The Commission commented on Congress's intention in its Notice for Proposed Rulemaking; quoting, "Con-

gress intended 'to establish a marketplace for the disposition of the rights to
retransmit broadcast signals; it is not the Committee's intention' in
this bill
88
to dictate the outcome of the enduing marketplace negotiations. The Omnibus Broadcasting Initiative ("OBI") found there was an increase in broadcasters electing to follow retransmission consent regulation,
and that only thirty-seven percent of stations elected must-carry regulation
to reach their MVPD customers in 2009.89 OBI credits this trend to broadcasters declining revenue under must-carry obligations. 90 In the event
where a retransmission consent agreement cannot be made between a
broadcaster and an MVPD, the MVPD cannot rebroadcast the broadcaster's
signal. The MVPD must have the broadcaster's consent to rebroadcast the
signal under Section 325(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 91
OBI notes that retransmission consent agreements allow broadcasters to
charge local stations "per subscriber" fees and retain carriage rights for additional content "owned by such stations or affiliated media conglomerates. 92 SHVIA affords DBS systems mandatory carriage obligations, giv85.
See In the Matter of Amendment of the Commission'sRules Related to Retransmission Consent, MB Docket No. 10-71, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, at 4, available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-11-31AI.pdf
(2011) [hereinafter
Notice of ProposedRulemaking].
86. See id.
87.
See id. at 5; see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 325(b), 338, 534 (2014); see generally id. §
614.
88.
See Notice of ProposedRulemaking, supranote 81, at 7 (citing S. Rep. No. 92,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1991, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1169.).
89.
See Omnibus Broadband Initiative, Spectrum Analysis: Options for Broadcast
Spectrum, OBI Technical Paper No. 3,
at 8 (June 2010), available at
http://transition.fcc.gov/national-broadband-plan/spectrum-analysis-paper.pdf
[hereingafter
OBI Paper].
90. See id. ("To offset declining revenues and to capitalize on the popularity of their
content, broadcasters have increasingly begun to waive their rights to must-carry and, instead, to negotiate retransmission consent agreements with MVPDs.").
91.
See 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1) ("No cable system or other [MVPD] shall retransmit the
signal of a broadcasting station, or any part thereof, except-(A) with the express authority of
the originating stations .... ").
92. OBI Paper,supra note 89, at 8 (giving examples of such rights as "cable networks
and multi-cast channels").
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ing them "a statutory copyright license to retransmit local broadcast stations to subscribers in the station's market," i.e. "local-into-local" services. 93 These local-to-local services force the satellite carrier to carry any
qualified local television in its respective Designated Market Area (DMA),
which elected for mandatory carriage. However, if the station's programming is duplicative from another station not in its DMA, or if the stations
do not provide a good quality signal to94the catier's local receive facility,
then it is exempt from this requirement.
As in cable, broadcasters have the option of using retransmission consent
provisions as an alternative to mandatory coverage for DBS, provided the
broadcaster has given the necessary consent for its copyrighted signal.
Section 325(b)(2) gives five exceptions to retransmission restrictions for
DBS stations:
(1) if the retransmission signals comes from a noncommercial television broadcast station;
(2) to retransmission of the signal of a television broadcast station
outside the station's local market by a satellite carrier directly to
its subscribers, if the station was considered a superstation by May
1, 1998, if the station is protected under a statutory license of Section 119 of Title 17 of the United States Code, and the satellite
carrier complies with any network nonduplication and syndicated
exclusivity;
(3) if the subscriber receiving the signal is located outside of the
DBS's local market and resides in an unserved household;
(4) if the signal is picked up by another form of a MVPD other
than a DBS signal; or
(5) if a retransmission signal protected under a Section 122 statutory license under Title 17 of the United States Code was attained
95
during the first six months of the enactment of 1999 SHVIA.
All negotiations concerning retransmission consent must be in "good
faith" as defined in Section 325 of the Act. 96 A retransmission consent negotiation in good faith is any agreement between the television broadcasters and MVPD that considers "the impact that the grant of retransmission
consent by television stations may have on the rates for the basic service
tier," and "[ensuring] that the regulations prescribed under this subsection
do not conflict with the Commission's obligation under [S]ection 623(b)(1)
to ensure that the rates for the basic service tier are reasonable." 97 Fur-

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See Notice of ProposedRulemaking, supra note 85, at
See § 338.
See id. § 325(b)(2)(A)-(E).
Id. (b)(3)(C)(iii).
See id. § 325(b)(3)(A).

6.
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thermore, good-faith-retransmission-consent negotiations apply to all transactions occurring between broadcast television stations and MVPDs (terrestrial or satellite).98
Section 325, provides an exception under subsection (b)(3)(C)(ii) after
its conjunction stating "it shall not be a failure to negotiate in good faith if
the television broadcast station enters into retransmission consent agreements containing different terms and conditions, including price terms,
with different [MVPDs] if such different terms and condition are based on
competitive marketplace considerations." 99 Meaning if a laser satellite
company services California, it cannot enforce rates on its NBC Murrieta
station, a much smaller market, based solely on rates it charges its NBC
Beverly Hills station, a much larger market, because good faith is predicated on the transaction being relevant to the market the signal will be broadcasted.
The Commission greatly relied on Section 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act
and labor law precedents for its good faith bargaining requirement standards.100 The Commission has a two-part framework to determine whether
the transaction is within the scope of good faith.0 1 First, the Commission
refers to its seven objective good faith negotiation standards to see if it is a
per se breach.10 2 Second, if the licensee meets the statutory standards, then
the Commission may consider a party's failure to negotiate retransmission
consent in good faith based on the totality of the circumstances. 0 3 If the
Commission finds that the parties could not make an agreement in good
faith, then it will instruct the parties to renegotiate in accordance with the
Commission's good faith standards as defined in Section 325(b)(3)(C).1 °4
Although the statute does not define an authority to impose damages, the
Commission has assumed direct authority as it has in all matters under the
Communications Act. 10 5 The Commission has noted that the statute does
98.

See Notice of ProposedRulemaking, supra note 85, at

99.

§ 325(b)(3)(C)(ii).

8.

100. Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improver Improvement Act of 1999;
Retransmission Consent Issues: Good Faith Negotiation and Exclusivity, First Report and
Order,
15
FCC
Rcd
5445,
5448,
6
(2000)
available
at

http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Orders/2000/fccOO099.pdf [hereinafter Order].
See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 85, at

10; see also 47 C.F.R. §

76.65(b)(1)-(2) (2013).
102. Id. § 76.65(b)(1).
103. Id. § 76.65(b)(2).
104. See Order, supra note 100, at 8.
105. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 85, at

101.

10 ("While the Commis-

sion did not find any statutory authority to impose damages, it noted "that, as with all viola-

tions of the Communications Act or the Commission's rules, the Commission has the authority to impose forfeitures for violations of Section 325(b)(3)(C).").
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not give it authority to impose intrusive regulations on the transacting parties to conduct good faith retransmission consent agreements and may only
intervene when contracting parties have compromised its good faith standard. 10 6 Congress intended the Commission to "develop and enforce a process that ensures that broadcasters and MVPDs meet to negotiate retransmission consent and that such negotiations are conducted in an atmosphere
of honesty, purpose, and clarity of process. 1 0 The Commission has noted
that there is little precedent regarding good faith rule violations and cited to
only one filing of a party dealing in bad faith. 08
Retransmission consent regulations have a direct impact on MVPD consumers, as well. For example, when high-profile cases arise, the result generally ends in carrier impasses, most notably the dispute between Cablevision System Corp. ("Cablevision") and News Corp.1 09 The controversy
was the result of the two companies' failure to agree on an extension or renewal agreement for two Fox-affiliated television stations and one MyNetwork TV-affiliated television station, which expired on October 15,
2010.0 As a result, Cablevision was subjected to a carriage stalemate
which adversely affected Cablevision's subscribers, because, as part of the
impasse, Cablevision had to forfeit its carrier rights until an agreement was
met, which did not happen until October 30, 2010.1 In the interim, Cablevision subscribers were not able to watch the Major League Baseball
National League Championship Series, the first two games of the World
Series, National Football League regular season games, and all regularly
scheduled programs on these channels. 1 2 Outcomes, such as these, have a
direct cost to MVPD provider, and the consumer. It is something laser
communication MVPDs should consider when providing this service.
IV. CAN THE COMMISSION REGULATE LASER COMMUNICATION UNDER
SECTION 706 OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996?
This paper proposes using the Commission's ancillary authority under
Section 706 to allocate electromagnetic spectrum under Section 303(y).
These provisions used in conjunction act as an affirmative authority to govern over laser communications when used to encourage more "advanced
communication" deployment.
106. See Order,supra note 100, at 23.
107.
See id.
108.
See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 85, at
Jorge L. Bauermeister, 22 FCC Rcd 4933 (MB 2007)).
109.
See id. at 15.
110. See id.
111.
See id.
112. See id.

12 (citing to Letter to
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A. Section 706
The Commission could classify laser communications as an "advance communication" under Section 706.113 The Commission has traditionally used this authority to encourage broadband deployment and, also,
for its so-called "net neutrality" rules.1 1 4 Of note, there is no formal definition of "advanced telecommunications. " '
Neither does the Section provide an explicit nor implicit limitation on the Commission's ability to include laser communications as an advanced telecommunication.
Section 706 the 1996 Act is broken up into two sections: Sections
706(a) and (b). There is some confusion in the courts as to whether both
sections act as independent authorities or whether subsection (a) is merely a
policy statement and, when not followed, triggers the authority under subsection (b). The most recent1 6"net neutrality" controversy best illustrates
these two schools of thought.
To give a brief historical overview, the Commission used Section 706 as
its legal justification over broadband providers in its First Open Internet
Order.11 7 The First Open Internet Order imposed three duties on broadband providers: (1) they could not block bits from content providers (i.e.,
non-blocking rule); (2) they could not discriminate against certain bits (i.e.,
non-discriminatory rule); and (3) they must disclose the treatment of bits to
the Commission upon a complaint (i.e., the transparency rule).11
As it related to the Commission's First Internet Order, Verizon challenged the Commission's Section 706 authority in the D.C. Circuit.11 9 The
Court struck down the non-blocking and non-discriminatory rules, because
these rules were more akin to "common carrier" obligations under Title II

113.
See 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1995)
114. See Preserving the Internet, GN Docket No. 09-191, et at., Report and Order, 25
FCC Rcd 17905, 17969 (2010) [Hereinafter First Open Internet Order] ("Under Section
706(a), the Commission must encourage the deployment of such capability by 'utilizing, in

a manner consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity,' various tools including 'measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment.' 360 For the reasons
stated in Parts II.A, II.D and II.B, above, our open Internet rules will have precisely that
effect.").

115. Neither in the Communications Act nor in the Telecommunications Act's definitions section provides a formal definition of an "advanced telecommunications." See supra
Part V.A, text and accompanying notes.
116. Compare Verizon v. F.C.C., 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Circuit 2010) (claiming that
706(a) and (b) are not independent authorities), with In re FCC 11-161, 753 F.3d at 1053
(holding 706(a) and (b) are independent authorities).
117.
See FirstOpen Internet Order,supra 114, at 17968.
118. See id. at 3.
119.
See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 623.
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of the Act and, at the time, broadband services were designated as "information services" subject to Title I obligations under its ancillary authority. 12

However, the D.C. Circuit upheld the Commission's transparency

rule, which gave the Commission ancillary jurisdiction to request information from broadband providers regarding how they maintain their networks. 121 More importantly, the D.C. Court held that both Sections 706(a)
and (b) provided enough ambiguity for1 22the Commission to determine what
type of authority Section 706 provides.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Commission's 706 authority, as it relates
to USF programs.12 The Court held that Section 706(a) is not an independent grant of authority, but a direction for the Commission to use its forbearance and other authority granted elsewhere in the 1996 Act. 124 The Tenth
Circuit upheld the Commission's conclusion that Section 706(b) is an "additional source of support" to impose a broadband requirement to its highcost program. 125 Furthermore, to the extent the Commission relies on Section 706(b) to support said requirement, the Court held Section 706(b) is
not contrary to Section 254 in terms of potential uses for USF funds to provide "telecommunications services. 26 The Tenth Circuit expanded the
Commission's authority by allowing it to mandate carriers to provide such
service to promote a particular initiative in the public interest, in this case,
broadband deployment.
Using this analytical framework and examining the plain language
of the statute, one could conclude that laser communication services could
be included in the Commission's initiative to "encourage the deployment..

120. Cf Nat'l Cable & Telecom. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967 (2005)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (giving the Commission full deference to designate Internet services
as an "information service" under Title I of the Act).
121.
See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 664 n. 8.
122. See id. at 641 ("Contrary to Verizon's arguments, we believe the Commission has
reasonably interpreted section 706(b) to empower it to take steps to accelerate broadband
deployment if and when it determines that such deployment is not 'reasonable and timely.'
To be sure... the provision may certainly be read to accomplish as much, and given such
ambiguity we have no basis for rejecting Commission's determination that it should be so
understood.").
123. See In re FCC 11-161,753 F.3d at 1055.
124. See id. at 1041 ("The [APA] directs us to 'hold unlawful and set aside agency action and conclusion found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law' .... Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, 'a reviewing
court may not set aside an agency rule that is rational, based on consideration of the relevant
factors and within the scope of the authority delegated to the agency by [706]').
125.
See id. at 1054.
126. See id.
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• of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans. 127 According to the statute, the Commission may regulate such entities assuming it
has the proper "regulatory jurisdiction over [those] telecommunications
services." 12 ' The next subsection addresses this point.
1. Encouragingmore lasercommunication deployment is in the public
interest, which triggers the Commission's ancillaryjurisdiction under
Section 706.

The Commission may have Section 706 authority under its ancillary jurisdiction. As previously stated, the Commission attains ancillary jurisdiction when "[it] has subject matter jurisdiction over the communications at
issue and the assertion of jurisdiction is reasonably required to perform an
express statutory obligation. ' , 129 Section 706(a) clearly sets out an affirmative obligation to "encourage the deployment" of advanced telecommunications.130 This obligation must fall within the "public interest, convenience,
and necessity, price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that
promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or other
131
regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment.,
Looking at the plain meaning of the statutory language, one can infer from
the disjunctive phrase that all the Commission needs to show is that its objective falls into at least one of the listed justifications under Section 706.
For instance, it has become clear in the telecommunications market that
there is a limited amount of an invaluable resource: the amount of radio
spectrum for cell phones. 132 Assuming the Commission satisfies its APA
obligations, it would not be too difficult for the Commission to establish
that deploying more technologies using a different band of the electromagnetic spectrum is in furtherance of the "public interest" or "promot[ing]
competition,, 133 triggering its ancillary authority under Section 706.
Moreover, there is nothing in the ordinary language of the statute explicitly listing a particular technology. As a general policy, the Commission
tends to be technology neutral in all of its issues, and thus the statute as a
whole fits this description. 134

127.
See 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a).
128.
See id.
129.
See Southwestern Cable, Co., 392 U.S. at 178; see also supra Part III.C.
130. See 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a).
131.
See id.
132. Cf Larry Downes, Averting a Spectrum Disaster:Now for the Hard Part, CNET
(Feb. 25, 2012, 2:37 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/averting-a-spectrum-disaster-now-forthe-hard-part/.
133. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b).
134. E.g., Tom Wheeler, Technology Transitions: Consumers Matter Most, FEDERAL
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Section 706(b) may give the Commission the authority to impose obligations on laser communications carriers to fulfill its policy goals. The section clearly sets out an obligation for the Commission to "take immediate
action to accelerate deployment of such capability by removing barriers to
infrastructure investment and by promoting competition in the telecommunications market., 13 5 Adding another competitor in the wireless marketplace, such as a laser communications carrier, could serve as a measure in
furtherance of the agency's policy, but the proper procedure must be in
place.
Initially, the statute requires the Commission to put out a Notice of Inquiry to "determine whether advanced telecommunications capability is being deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion. ' ,136 The
Commission should direct its Notice of Inquiry at ameliorating the spec-

trum crunch and ask whether adding laser frequencies to assist in solving
this problem is a viable option. The notice should also address whether the
Commission is required to trigger its ancillary jurisdiction to promote "advanced communications" under Section 706, 137 and has statutory ground to
regulate the technology under Section 303(y):
(y) Have authority to allocate electromagnetic spectrum so as to

provide flexibility of use, if-(1) such use is consistent with international agreements to which the United States is a party; and (2)
the Commission finds, after notice and an opportunity for public
comment, that-(A) such an allocation would be in the public interest; (B) such use would not deter investment in communications services and systems, or technology development; and (C)

such use would not result in harmful interference among users.131
Although legislative action is preferable, through a proper rulemaking
procedure it may be possible for the Commission to include waves utilized
by laser communications satellites as part of the definition of the electromagnetic spectrum under Section 303(y). However, the obvious limitation

in using this method is the fact that the language of the statute only permits
the Commission to "allocate" spectrum.

Stakeholders providing laser

communications who wish to challenge the Commission's authority could
do so whether or not this serves as a limitation in regulating the actual serCOMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION

BLOG

(Oct.

31,

2014

2:10

PM),

http://www.fcc.govlblog/technology-transitions-consumers-matter-most ("Technology transitions will be speeded by technology-neutral rules that promote, preserve, and protect the
enduring values that consumers have rightly come to expect ... .

135.
136.

See § 1302(b).
See id.

137.
138.

See id. § 1302(a).
See id. § 303(y) (emphasis added).

AMERICAN UNIV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BRIEF

Vol. 6:2

vices provided, which remains unclear.
2. Section 706 is technology neutral based on the legislative intent.
When drafting Section 706, Congress intended only to provide
broadband services to the American public.13 9 It was mostly a response to
the expansion of Internet-consumer use. 14 Based on the Senate Report, a
reasonable interpretation of the term "advanced communications" would be
broadband-based technology. 14 However, laser communication was not
even in production for commercial use at the time Congress was developing this statute. The underlying Congressional intent was to provide more
"broadband services" to the American public and to have more economic2
participants through "a strong, advanced communications infrastructure.""
Additionally, Congress claimed these capabilities "not only allow individuals to communicate and exchange information but also serve as the platform on which much of entertainment, commerce, and communication will
take place .'143 Congress understood the public interest in facilitating this
industry's growth.
Additionally, Congress did not say broadband services must include services through fiber-optic wire networks, satellites, or copper-wire lines. It
merely described what broadband services make available. Laser communication was not yet a factor in providing such services at the time Section
706 was drafted. Therefore, there was no possible way for Congress to
consider it as an option for providing broadband services to consumers. It
is conceivable that, if Congress had this option available, they would have
considered laser communication as part of this broadband-deployment initiative.
The term broadband does not necessarily imply a particular technology.

139. S. REP. 110-204, at 1 (2008) ("The purpose of S. 1492 is to improve the quality of
data collected at State and Federal levels regarding the availability and robustness of broadband services and to promote the deployment of affordable broadband services to all parts of
the Nation.").
140. See id.
141. Id. at 2 ("Efforts by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to measure
the speed and quality of broadband deployment across the United States originated after
Congress enacted of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Under section 706 of that Act,
the FCC is required to conduct regular inquiries concerning the availability of advanced telecommunications capability and to determine whether advanced telecommunications capability is being deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion. If such determination is negative, the statute further requires the FCC to 'take immediate action to
accelerate deployment' by 'removing barriers to infrastructure investment' and 'promoting
competition."').

142.

See id. at 1.

143.

See id.
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Merriam Webster dictionary defines "broadband" as "of, relating to, or being a high-speed communications network and esp. one in which a frequency range is divided into multiple independent channels for simultaneous transmission of signals (as voice, data, or video)." 144 Thus, nothing in
the dictionary definition actually implicates a particular type of technology.145 Moreover, if one were to accept the definition previously cited, then
it would not be farfetched to include laser communication transmissions in
the Commission's regulatory definition.
If the Commission were to adopt a more inclusive interpretation of the
term "broadband," it would further its goals outlined in Section 706 and, by
extension, be consistent with Congress's goals discussed in the Senate Report. Since there is no legislative guidance on whether Congress intended
to exclude laser communication technologies, it logically follows that laser
communications has a role in promoting Congress's goal.
Still, is Section 706 only limited to broadband capabilities for laser
communications or could it apply to all services seeing as the statute has
both "advance telecommunications" and "information services?" One
could interpret "advance telecommunications" to be distinct from "information services" because of the mention of the two terms in the statute and
in the Senate Report. Meaning that if Congress intended information services to be equal to an advanced telecommunication, then why have the
two terms separated in both their discussions and in the actual statute? This
makes Congressional intent unclear and should be left up the expertise of
the agency to determine Congress's meaning so long as it passes Chevron
analysis. Because the Commission currently classifies broadband services
as information services, it would not be unreasonable for the Commission
to make this distinction between "information services" and "advance

144. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
DICTIONARY 156 (11th ed. 2007), available at
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/broadband.
145. Eg. id. (defining broadband as "of, pertaining to, or responsive to a continuous,

wide

range

of

frequencies");

TECHTERMS.COM,

http://www.techterms.com/definition/broadband (last visited Nov. 23. 2014) (defining
broadband as "refers to high-speed data transmission in which a single cable can carry a
large amount of data at once"); Margaret Rouse, Broadband, TechTarget,
http://seajt5rchtelecom.techtarget.com/definitionbroadband (last visited Nov. 23, 2014) (defining broadband as "telecommunication in which a wide band of frequencies is available to
transmit information. Because a wide band of frequencies is available, information can be
multiplexed and sent on many different frequencies or channels within the band concurrently, allowing more information to be transmitted in a given amount of time (much as more
lanes on a highway allow more cars to travel on it at the same time). Related terms are
wideband (a synonym), baseband (a one-channel band), and narrowband (sometimes meaning just wide enough to carry voice, or simply 'not broadband,' and sometimes meaning
specifically between 50 cps and 64 Kpbs").
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communications." This interpretation would open the door for the Commission to define the term "advance communications" as communications
provided by laser satellites and distinct from broadband services. To accomplish this, the Commission would need some statutory grounds in the
Act, and Section 303(y) may suffice so long as it adds laser frequencies to
the term "electromagnetic spectrum."
However, the APA requires the
Commission to perform a proper rulemaking process to make this distinction. Until the Commission satisfies its APA obligations, laser communications remains virtually unregulated.
CONCLUSION

The Commission could have some authority to regulate laser communications satellite, but it would depend on the type of services provided by
the carrier. There are also some regulatory limitations based on the explicit
mention of "wire or radio" in the statutes of the Communications Act, but
the Commission may overcome said limitations by using its ancillary jurisdiction to encourage "advanced telecommunications" services so long as it
uses some statutory basis in the original Act (i.e., Section 303(y)).
Currently companies, such as Laser Light, can circumvent the Commission's licensing requirements to provide services until the FCC conducts a
proper rulemaking process satisfying its APA requirement. Until then, it
will remain virtually unregulated. As outlined in this Article, as long as the
Commission makes reasonable interpretations of its statue, the Commission
should start considering how it intends to regulate such entities.
Moreover, assuming the definitions in the Communications Act of 1934
pose any limitations on the Commission in regulating laser communications satellites, this Article offers the Commission's ancillary jurisdiction
under Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 with statutory
grounding in Section 303(y) of the Act as the proper statutory justification
and legal basis for such regulation.

